

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
USNMR SHAPE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 37220

GENEVA FOR SALT AND CCD DELS

BELGRADE FOR CSCE DEL

SHAPE AND CINCEUR ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PCAT, NATO, CSCE, MARR, MNUC, FR
SUBJ: MITTERRAND'S DISARMAMENT STRATEGY

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER FRANCOIS
MITTERRAND HAS PUBLISHED A "DISARMAMENT STRATEGY."

SALIENT POINTS INCLUDE:

--JUSTIFICATION FOR MAINTAINING THE FRENCH NUCLEAR

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FORCE WHILE REDUCING IT.
--CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING.
--ADHERENCE TO EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.
--PARTICIPATION IN THE CCD.
--AN "UNCTAD" ON DISARMAMENT.
--A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE ALL CSCE PARTICI-
PANTS WHICH WOULD ABSORB THEATRE NUCLEAR ISSUES, TROOP

REDUCTIONS, CBMS, AND DEFENSE BUDGETS.

--UNILATERAL RESTRAINTS ON FRENCH CONVENTIONAL
ARMS EXPORTS.

COMMENT: MITTERRAND IS PROBABLY SEEKING TO REASSURE
SOCIALIST SUPPORTERS DISTURBED BY THE LEFT'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE AND ALSO TO
UPSTAGE GISCARD. MITTERRAND'S CONCRETE PROPOSALS
RANGE FROM REASONABLE TO UTOPIAN. ON THE WHOLE THE
STRATEGY IS LONG ON RHETORIC BUT SHORT ON
NEGOTIABILITY. END SUMMARY.

2. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE
FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY (PS) AND THE MAN WHO WOULD BE
PRIME MINISTER IN THE EVENT OF A LEFT VICTORY IN THE
MARCH ELECTIONS, HAS PUBLISHED A "STRATEGY FOR
DISARMAMENT." THE STRATEGY APPEARS IN A LENGTHY
TWO PART ARTICLE IN THE DECEMBER 14 AND 15
EDITIONS OF LE MONDE. WE ASSUME THAT FBIS IS TRANSLATING
THE PIECE FOR WASHINGTON READERS. THERE FOLLOWS
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE ARTICLES AND SOME COMMENTS THEREON.

3. MITTERRAND BEGINS BY REFERRING TO THE THREAT
POSED BY THE TWO SUPER-POWERS TO MEDIUM-POWERS.
WHILE HE FINDS A MILITARY ATTACK IMPROBABLE, HE DOES
SEE A NEW DANGER OF YIELDING THE WAY TO "ECONOMIC
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PRESSURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL HEGEMONY." THIS CHALLENGE
CAN BE MET ONLY BY "ANTONOMY OF DECISION" IN KEY
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL SECTIONS, EITHER IN
FRENCH HANDS ALONE OR IN CONCERT WITH FRANCE'S
EUROPEAN PARTNERS. FRENCH SECURITY WILL BE ASSURED
NEITHER BY UNILATERAL EFFORTS NOR BY ALLIANCES. A
POLICY OF ALLIANCE, WHILE NECESSARY, IS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO SAFEGUARD NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, BECAUSE, WHILE A
MILITARY CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE MIGHT SPARE THE
SANCTUARIES OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS, IT WOULD RAVAGE
EUROPE, NOT STOPPING AT THE RHINE. "THE
GROWING SOPHISTICATION OF WEAPONS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A GRAY AREA MINGLING NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS,
WOULD LEAVE IN RUIN A BATTLEFIELD STRETCHING AT LEAST
FROM BRITTANY TO THE UKRAINE."

4. THUS DISARMAMENT IS A VITAL ADDITION TO FRENCH
STRATEGY. "THE THIRD WORLD WAR, IF IT COMES, WILL
DEVASTATE EUROPE INCLUDING FRANCE." MITTERRAND THEN
ADDRESSES THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN A DESIRE
FOR DISARMAMENT AND THE DECISION OF THE FRENCH LEFT TO
MAINTAIN IN BEING THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE. THIS

FORCE, THOUGH NOT COMPARABLE TO THOSE OF THE SUPER-
POWERS, CAN INFLICT ENOUGH DAMAGE ON ANY

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AGRESSOR TO DETER. THE TEMPTATION IS GREAT
TO JUSTIFY PRESERVATION THE NUCLEAR FORCE SO AS NOT
TO IRRITATE THE (FRENCH) MILITARY WHO ARE CONCERNED
AT THE PROSPECT OF THE LEFT IN POWER, OR SO AS TO
AVOID WORRYING THE ALLIES. BUT THE PS WILL PURSUE
DISARMAMENT WHILE MAINTAINING THE NUCLEAR FORCE.

5. THE PS WOULD SET AN EXAMPLE BY ABANDONING THE
MIRAGE IV BOMBERS WHICH ARE THE AIR ELEMENT OF THE
NUCLEAR FORCE. IN THE EVENT OF GENUINE PROGRESS IN
NEGOTIATIONS, THE IRBMS ON THE PLATEAU D'
ALBION WOULD BE RENOUNCED. AT THE SAME TIME
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FRANCE WOULD MOVE TO "RIGID CONSTRAINTS" ON ARMS EXPORTS, COMBAT THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND CEASE NUCLEAR TESTING.

6. MITTERRAND CRITICIZES DE GAULLE, POMPIDOU, AND LGISCARD FOR KEEPING FRANCE OUT OF DISARMAMENT. CURRENT FRENCH POLICY HAS NOTHING (MEANINGFUL) TO SAY ON THE SUBJECT. AT THE SAME TIME THE FRENCH LEFT HAS TOO LONG CONCENTRATED ON THE DESIRABLE (GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT) AND NOT ON THE POSSIBLE. UNILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH FRANCE'S ALLIANCES ONLY ON CONDITION OF RESUMING MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND. MITTERRAND REJECTS A FRENCH ENTRY INTO DISARMAMENT WHICH WOULD CONSIST "ONLY" OF ADHERING TO THE VARIOUS TREATIES ALREADY NEGOTIATED AT THE BEHEST OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. FRANCE MUST NOT ONLY BE PRESENT IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS BUT "MUST HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY".

8. MITTERRAND SKETCHES A NUMBER OF FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DEVELOPING A DISARMAMENT STRATEGY:

- IT SHOULD BE GLOBAL AND SIMULTANEOUS.
- IT CAN NOT BE LIMITED TO ONE REGION.
 - TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND "GRAY AREAS" RENDER MORE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ARMS.
- CIVIL NUCLEAR EXPORTS RAISE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, "EVEN IF THE PAKISTAN AND BRAZIL CONTRACTS DO NOT RAISE AS MANY FEARS."
- SALT CUTS ACROSS MBFR WHILE BELGRADE DEALS WITH MANEUVERS AND CBMS.
- CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES, UNPOLICED IN FRANCE, ARE

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PARTITIONED IN FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS.

- FRANCE OUGHT TO BE INVOLVED IN ALL THESE DISARMAMENT AREAS.

9. MITTERRAND MAKES THE FOLLOWING CONCRETE PROPOSALS:

- ADHERENCE TO EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO.
- REVISION OF THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR (JUNE 22, 1973) TO ELIMINATE THE SUPER-POWER ROLE OF WORLD POLICEMAN.

--PARTICIPATION IN THE CCD BY ABOLISHING THE US-SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP.

--A MAJOR ROLE FOR FRANCE IN THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE SSOD INTO AN "UNCTAD" OF DISARMAMENT IN THREE STAGES:

- A. A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.
- B. CREATION OF AN ORGANISM WITH RESTRICTED MEMBERSHIP SIMILAR TO THE CCD.
- C. SPECIALIZED CONFERENCES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, ARMS TRANSFERS, AND REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS.

--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT INSTALLATIONS WITH REINFORCED CONSTRAINTS ON SALES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND SENSITIVE ITEMS.

10. THE EUROPEAN THEATRE:

MITTERRAND STATES THAT THE ABSENCE OF FRANCE AND THE UK FROM SALT CAN NOT BE ACCEPTED OVER THE LONG TERM. CSCE CONCENTRATES LITTLE OF ITS EFFORT ON SECURITY ISSUES, ALTHOUGH CBMS ARE NOT WITHOUT INTEREST. MBFR IS PARALYZED BECAUSE OF:

- A. THE BLOCK-TO-BLOCK NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATION.
 - B. ARGUMENTS OVER DATA, WITH SOVIETS REFUSING TO ADMIT THE MANIFESTLY SUPERIOR NUMBERS IN THE EAST.
 - C. THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION OF DISCUSSING US AND SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS TO GROSSLY UNEQUAL
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DISTANCES.

11. IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE "PROGRESSIVE AND

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SIMULTANEOUS DISSOLUTION OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO,
"A FRENCH MBFR DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE INSERTED
INTO THE NATO GROUP. THUS MITTERRAND IS LED TO
PROPOSE A "EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON REDUCTION OF FORCES
AND TENSION." ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING NATIONS WOULD
ATTEND. THE NEW CONFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE IN
SCOPE:

- A. THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF CSCE.
- B. THE MANDATE OF MBFR.
- C. ALL NUCLEAR FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE.
- D. US AND SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS AFFECTING
EUROPE.

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E. DEFENSE BUDGETS.

- 12. THE NEW CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE SEVERAL BASKETS:
 - A. NUCLEAR: REPRESENTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS NATIONS
AND THOSE NATIONS WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE STORED.
 - B. DEPLOYED FORCES: REPRESENTING ALL NATIONS
SENDING OR PERMITTING TROOPS TO BE DEPLOYED IN
EUROPE.
 - C. DEFENSE EFFORTS: BUDGETS AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
 - D. REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
 - E. CBMS AND CONTROLLING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT.

MITTERRAND PROPOSES THAT THE DECISION TO HOLD THIS
CONFERENCE BE AGREED TO DURING THE SSOD. ONCE THE
CONFERENCE CONVENES FRANCE WOULD RENOUNCE ITS MIRAGE IV
NUCLEAR DELIVERY BOMBERS AND WOULD PROPOSE A GLOBAL

CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
TROOP REDUCTIONS WOULD FOLLOW ALONG WITH THE CREATION
OF A BUFFER ZONE ALONG THE "IRON CURTAIN" IN WHICH
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD BE PROHIBITED.

13. ARMS EXPORTS:

MITTERRAND PROPOSES A UNILATERAL FRENCH GESTURE TO
START THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TOWARD RESTRAINT,
NOTING THAT FRANCE HAS A THIRD-WORLD IMAGE
AS A "MERCHANT OF DEATH." 275,000 PEOPLE ARE
EMPLOYED IN THE FRENCH ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY. MITTERRAND'S
PROGRAM INCLUDES:

A. CESSATION OF ALL SALES TO "COLONIAL, FASCIST,
OR RACIST" GOVERNMENTS (SOUTH AFRICA, CHILE, BRAZIL,
ARGENTINA WOULD BE "AMONG THE FIRST").

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B. REGIONAL CONFERENCES INVOLVING SUPPLIERS AND
RECIPIENTS, WITH THE FIRST SUCH IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

C. CONVERSION OF EXPORT CONTRACTS TO COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

D. OBLIGATORY NOTIFICATION OF ALL ARMS SALES
CONTRACTS TO THE APPROPRIATE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES
WITH AUTHORIZATION FROM THEM FOR ALL SALES EXCEEDING
ONE BILLION FRANCS.

E. CREATION OF NEW GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISMS TO
REGULATE THE ARMS BUSINESS.

14. COMMENT: MITTERRAND'S MOTIVATION.

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WE BELIEVE THAT TWO MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCED THE
PUBLICATION OF MITTERRAND'S DISARMAMENT STRATEGY:

A. A DESIRE TO REASSURE PS MILITANTS WHO ARE
TROUBLED BY THE PARTY'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRESERVA-
TION OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE.

B. A DESIRE TO OUTFLANK PRESIDENT GISCARD WHO
LAST FALL PROMISED A MAJOR FRENCH "DISARMEMENT VE
INITIATIVE". WHILE THE GOF HAS YET TO SETTLE ON THE
INITIATIVE, SOMETHING MAY WELL BE ANNOUNCED PRIOR TO
THE ELECTIONS. THE GOF WILL BE HARD PRESSED TO FIND
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AN AREA THAT MITTERRAND LEFT UNADDRESSED IN HIS CATCH-
ALL STRATEGY ARTICLE.

15. COMMENT: THE SUBSTANCE OF MITTERRAND'S
PROPOSALS.
SOME OF THE PROPOSALS SEEM WORTHY OF EXPLORATION
(E.G., CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT, ADHERENCE TO
EXISTING TREATIES). SOME SEEM SIMPLISTIC AND
UNDOABLE. THE ENLARGED CSCE TO TREAT ALL EUROPEAN
SECURITY ISSUES, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, STRIKES US
AS A NEGOTIATION WHICH COULD TIE UP ARMS CONTROL
PROPOSALS IN A 35 NATION CONFERENCE FOR YEARS, PRE-
CLUDING MORE LIMITED BUT WORTHWHILE ADVANCES.

IGNORING THE REITERATED SLAPS AT THE TWO SUPER-POWERS,
MITTERRAND HAS PRODUCED A STRATEGY WHICH PROVIDES THE
MOST COMPLETE EXPOSE TO DATE IN A FIELD WHERE SOCIALIST
POLICY HAS ALWAYS BEEN MARKED BY A HIGH DEGREE OF
RHETORIC AND LESS SPECIFICITY. WHILE CERTAIN PROPOSALS
ARE SHORT ON NEGOTIABILITY, THIS MIGHT BE EXPECTED
FROM A PARTY OUT OF POWER FOR FORTY YEARS.
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Message Attributes

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